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Once known, Truths acquire a utilitarian crust; they no longer
interest us as truths but as useful recipes. That pure, sudden
illumination which characterizes truth accompanies the latter only at
the moment of discovery. Hence its Greek name aletheia, which
origtnally meant the same as the word apocalypsis later, that is,
discovery, revelation, or rather, unveiling, removing a veil or cover. 1
Ortega y Gasset
The concept of truth enshrines at once the real being of things and
the revelation of things as they are in reality. The truth of being
comes to bear in its own light and in its own authority, constraining
us by the power of what it is to assent to it and acknowledge it for
what it is in itself. 5t Anselm who developed that further in a more
realist way held truth to be the reality of things as they actually are
independent of us before God and therefore as they ought to he
known and signified by us. Everything is what it actually is and not
something else and cannot according to its nature be other than it is.
That is what he called its inherent 'necessity" or 'truth.'2
Thomas F. Torrance
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Chapter 2 identifies the dual approach in Calvin's thought on the
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Theodore Beza, Heinrich Bullinger and Girolamo Zanchi and the
Lutherans. Chapters 6 and 7 give an account of the development of a
Covenant Theology and the reactions of the Refonned at the Synoo of
Dort to Arminianism. Chapter 8 explores the teaching of John
Cameron, whilst chapters 9 and 10 follow the development of
Cameron's theology at the hands of Moise Amyraut. The final chapter
concludes that the refonners never succeeded in defining the extent of
the atonement in a way which commanded general assent amongst
themselves. It is proposed that a new approach is required and that
Karl Barth's reworking of the Refonned doctrine of predestination
makes significant progress in resolving the inconsistencies of the
classical refonned stance.
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I. Introduction
The question and nature of truth has long been at the heart of
philosophical ConCenl at various levels and within and between
schools of thought and method·. Truth as 'correspondence,'
however that has been construed historically, has remained at
the center among the major competing views on the nature of
truth. It has been called by some the 'common-sense' perspective. Yet in the last two centuries it has faced, as have emphases on
Jose Ortega y Gas.set, Meditations on Qui.rote, trans. E. Rugg and D. Marin
(New York: Norton, 1961) p. 67.
• Thomas F. Torrance, Reality and Scientific ~ (Edinburgh: The Scottish
Academic Pre.., 1961), p. 141, Hereafter RST.
1
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(critical) realist knowledge of the world, much negative response.' In the twentieth centuIy such antagonism has arisen not
only from among neo-Kantians and some analytical philosophers
but from philosophers influenced by the thought of Martin
Heidegger. It has been commonplace in some quarters to identifY
Heidegger's understanding of truth as 'disclosure' or 'uncovering'
(a-letheia) as an overthrowing of the old, static, constrictive
correspondence notions of truth. But this is not in fact what
Heidegger has expressed. In fact his point is to support or
undergird correspondence truth by his emphasis on disclosure. It
is this interpretation of Heidegger which Reformed Christian
theolOgian Thomas Torrance carefully appropriates for his own
discussions of the Truth of God disclosed in his Word-thus his
emphases on both correspondence and coherence truth, and on
critical realism.
II. COJTeSpondence Truth: Some Classical Expressions
In the process of examining Martin Heidegger's apparently
negative response to 'correspondence theories' of truth, it is
necessary that one see clearly that against which Heidegger is
responding. For that reason we will examine briefly what are
often regarded as three 'classical' formulations of correspondence truth in the Western tradition: the Platonic, the Aristotelian
and the Thomistic. In the words of Richard Rorly, these three are
all found (rightly or wrongly) to fall within the paradigm of 'the
mind as a great mirror, containing various representationssome accurate, some not-and capable of being studied by pure,
nonempirical methods. '4
Plato's understanding of correspondence truth is said to be
covertly developed in the Republic, with the first explicit formulations of a correspondence theory to he found in the Sophist and
the Theaetetus. Yet even here Plato seems to reflect some
hesitation about it. In the Sophist, truth as correspondence is
pres~ted ~ relation to basic inst~ces of human judgment
illvolvmg direct perceptual apprehenslon of the current condition
of a particular given. Regarding the truth or falsity of statements,
In contrast to naive realism, critical realism, as Torrance understands it, seeks

knowledge of and correction by the external fuct of the object, 'the truth of
thin$. J 'Ihe mind must be yielded to and tested by the object as it discloses

itsell:

'This is set against a dualism which would separate object from
knower.
, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the MirTOr of Nature (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979), p. 12.
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'the true one states about you the things that are as they are,' and
'the faIse statement states about you things different from the
things that are.'5 While the dialogue questions the human
capacity to know what is real and what is unreal at several
points, the Stranger proposes a definition of 'real being' as that
which is constituted so as to 'possess any sort of power either to
affect anything else or to he affected.'" But if knowing is an
'acting upon' the object known, then to he known is to be
changed. But this cannot occur in that which is changeless.' But
Plato, throu~ the Stranger, is not asserting that reality is only the
'changeless, that which cannot he acted upon by the knower.
Rather, as he later asserts, reality is comprised of both 'all that is
changeless and all that is in change.'8 But in the Sophist, Plato's
arguments are not brought to resolution in relation to presentations of truth as correspondence. Correspondence theory is here
qualified by attendant arguments which question the simplicity
or self-evidence of perceptual givens as static realities which can
be 'read off the surface.'
Similar {,oints are developed in the Theaetetus where Socrates
says that things are not given in themselves but rather 'for each
other,' i.e., 'whether we speak of something's 'being' or its
'becoming,' we must speak of it as being or becoming for
someone, or of something, or toward something.'" He then
develops the argument that 'agent' and 'patient' are relative to
each other, which raises the problem of relativism, that 'what
every man believes as a result of perception is ... true for him.'
To avoid this, Socrates turns the argument away from perception
to the mental operations involved in perceptuaIly grounded
judgments. Knowledge occurs on a level that is as much mental
as perceptual, as shown by knowledge based on memory,
knowledge of a fact not even present to the senses and thus
de,!"ed not from sense experience but from mental operations
which transcend such (as in mathematics). Along simllar lines,
~ates finally ~oncludes that
must not look for (knowledge)
ill sense perception at all, but ill what goes on when the mind is

:we

Plato, Sophist 236a, trans. P.M. Comfocd, Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), pp. 957-1085.
6 lbid., p. 247e.
7 Ibid., p. 248e.
• ibid., p. 249d.
9 Plato, Theaetetus l6Oc, trans. F.M. Cornford, CoUected Dialogues (Princeton:
Princeton University Pre.s, 1961), pp. 845-919.
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occupied with things by itseI£ '10 Having thus problematically
transferred truth to the level of mental operations, he asserts that
~~ and no! knowing ?I"e identical to being and not being,
I.e., one who thinks w/wJ; IS rwt about anything cannot but be
thinking what is false,'11 again, a simple form of correspondence
theory. Yet, again, counter arguments are raised here in relation
to the notion of falsehood. It would seem that Plato's early
description of correspondence truth leaves much that is
unresolved.
Aristotle's version of truth as correspondence, as found in the
Metaphysics, is not qualified in context in the way Plato does
with his version. While discussing the law of the excluded middle,
he makes the following clear definition of truth as correspondence: 'To say that what is is, and that what is not is not, is true;
and therefore also he who says that a thing is or is not will say
either what is true or what is false.''' This definition again seems·
limited by the context to clear cut instances of a correspondence
between a mental reflection and particular perceptual objects. A
middle ground in which things can be understood in more than
one way and in which changes of judgement can occur is
excluded, greatly limiting the applicability of Aristotle's definition
of truth.'3 Like Plato in tlie Sophist, Aristotle seems to transfer the
problem of truth from the level of sense perceptions alone to·an
operation 'in thought.' Hence, Aristotle maintains that truth is
grounded upon the capacity of the mind to make judgments and,
thereby, statements about what is and what is not, and to relate
these statements by combinations and separation to particular
perceptual experiences." In the NlComachean Ethics Aristotle
places his notion of correspondence truth into a wider context.
He asserts that 'there are three elements in the soul which control
action and the attainment of truth: namely, Sensations, Intellect
(rwus), and Desire.'15 In relation to these three elements, the
theory of correspondence, as described in the Metaphysics, is
held to be adequate only to the 'truth of intellect.'
St Thomas Aquinas gives much attention to a theory of truth as
correspondence following the Aristotelian model. But here Aris10

11
12
13

14
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Ibid., 187a.
Ibid. 188d.
Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.7.1, trans. Hugb Tredennick (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1933) (Loeb ed., pp. 199--201).
Ibid. 4.6.8.
Ibid. 6.4.3.
~totle, Nicomachian Ethics 62.1, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard
Universi1y Press, 1962) (Loeb ed., pp. 327-329).

aJ Torran£e

143

totle's correspondence theory of truth undergoes something of a
division or bifurcation because of Thomas' theological position.
He starts with a problem posed by the understanding oJtruth as
based on the intelligible grasping of sensible forms. In response to
Augustine's view that truth is in the mind, he endeavors to
resolve the contradiction by first contrasting truth or knowledge
with desire. The goal (end) of desire, which is the good, is in the
thing destred while the 'end or term of knowledge, which is truth,
is in the mind,' i.e., while the direction of desire is outward to the
thing, the direction of knowledge is rather from the thing to the
mind.'· This is because the referent of knowledge is the experience of truth, which is not given in the thing itselfbut is a mental
phenomenon. Thus Thomas largely agrees with Aristotle, while
also developing Aristotle's thought on truth as correspondence.
While Thomas' resolution of the problem arising from the .
existence of objects that are not presently standing in perceptual
relation to the knower in the differentiation between human and
divine intellects is of interest and could further illustrate the
points previously made, it is of little use for our purposes
here. 17

m. Martin Heidegger's Apparent Negation of
'CoITeSpondence Truth' and Truth as 'Disclosnre'
In Being and Time, and less directly in 'On the Essence of Truth,'
Martin Heidegger seems highly critical of correspondence theories of truth which, he says, are determined by 'the kind of
relation that obtains between the statement and the thing. '18 Most
expoSitions of Heidegger's influential understanding of a-letheia
(as 'unveiling', 'unhiddenness' or 'dis-closure' which occurs in
the mode of relationality in the context of human existence in the
world) regard his position as one which casts off or overthrows
correspondence notions of truth in relation to objective reality.
This is a position or interpretation often taken, assumed and
repeated by, e.g., W. Kaufinan, F. Olafson, T. Langar, M. Grene,
M. Gelven, W. Richardson, W. Macomber,). Rouse, M. Okrent and
). Macquarrie and especially in the analytical tradition. In his
16

St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae la. 16. 1, trans. Thomas GomaIl, SJ.
(New York.: McGraw-Hill, 1564), 4::75.

" Ibid. The discussion oOamesJ. Dicenso has been helpful at several points. Cf.
below.
" Martin Heldegger, 'On tiIe Essence of Truth,' Basic Wrl~ of Martin
~ (New York: Halper and Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 123. Hereafter
BW.
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influential philosophical hermeneutics, Anthony Thiselton has
developed and analyzed at length the existential ontology of
Martin Heidegger and the effects ofhis thought upon contemporary questions of interpretation. Thiselton is quite typical when,
with regard to Heidegger's assessment of correspondence truth,
he states that
Heidegger repeatedly urges that we must avoid anything which
suggests a correspondence theory of truth ... This apProaCh to the
question of 'reality' naturally leads on to Heidegger's rejection of a
correspondence view of truth ... 'Representations' (VorsteUungen)
do not get compared ... What is to be demonstrated is solely the
being-uncovered of the entity itself . • • Hence he (Heideggerj can
never he satisfied with a correspondence view of truth which locates
truth in terms of relationships between concepts 'in the mind' and
'reality out there.'''
A simiIar recent example of such an interpretation of Heidegger
is found within James J. Dicenso's larger discussion of Heiaegger's ontological emphasis on truth as disclosure. He understands
Heidegger's position to be one which stands in marked and
critical-contrast to the grouping of views classified as 'correspondence theories of truth'-'disclosure' is found to stand
outside of and over against 'correspondence.' He says,
A1etheia, Heidegger argues, means 'unhiddenness,' and this tells us
something about the nature of truth . . . Heidegger introduces the
argument for truth as disclosure by indicating the limitations of
correspondence theories .. . Modes of relatlonality, or being open,
antecede any specific and detenninable existential encounter or
experience. That is, the open region is a necessary dimension of the

human capacity to relate hermeneuticaIly to a world and to others
and hence to have any form of experience ... Heidegger's argument
is that prior to any possible experience of truth as corresponaence of
entity and idea there must he a constitutive region of disclosure that
informs the specific mode of apprehension of the given ... no
judgment ... is purely objective and context free.2O

Dicenso's ensuing discussion interprets Heidegger's emphasis on
'disclosure' truth to be one of relegation of correspondence truth
(if not, in fact, negating it finally) to a place of very minor
19

Anthony C. 1hiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Henneneutics and
Philosophical Description with Special Rej'fffeflCe to He~, Bultmann,

~n (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1980), pp. 151, 174, 199.
'" James J. DiCenso, Hermeneotics and the Disclosore of Truth: A Study in the
Work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur (Charlottesville, Va: The University
Pre.. of Vu-ginia. 1990), pp. 56--M.

Gadamer, and
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usefulness for the question and contexts of truth because of its
static and oppressive nature. Indeed, it is true that Heidegger
does often speak in very negative terms in reference to the
correspondence theory of truth, i.e., that the correspondence
notion makes 'truth' into a thing, that it 'ossifies' truth within
notions of confonnity and agreement (adequatio intellectus eI
rei) and thereby 'covers over'the ontolOgical reality of Truth. 21
But are Thiselton's and Dicenso's (el. al.) interpretations of
Heidegger as one who has endeavored essentially to push aside
or overthrow correspondence truth accurate? Is Martin Heidegger's understanding of Truth (aletheia) as 'disclosure' such that
any real sense of correspondence truth is all but cast out as a
viable understanding of truth?
Iv. Heldegger, 'Disclosure,' and 'Correspondence' Truth: An

Analysis of Being and Time
The opening quotation from Ortega y Gasset anticipates several
of the questions and issues which Martin Heidegger subsequently
developed, including his particular etymological concern for the
Greek term aletheia. A/etheia became a means whereby, in the
pursuit of Sein or 'Being-as-such,' he explicated the disclosive
dimension (as the ontological dimension, i.e., more original) of
Truth. In this Dicenso must be recognized as at least partly
correct when he pointed out the 'prior-ness' of Truth as
disclosure to any other 'ontic' questions or positions on the
nature of truth. While our focus herein will be given to the pivotal
forty-fourth section ('1144) of Being and Time, it being Heidegger's
most developed expression of ' truth as disclosure,' this discussion
must be prepared for by a preIirninary unfolding of context and
argument.'"'
Section forty-four is the cuhnination and conclusion ofthe first
of the two major divisions of Being and Time (the promised
'third' part was never done). Division one is a preIirninary
analysis of the 'being ofDasein' (the 'being-there' of the existing
person) as 'being-in-the-world' in all of its that-ness or facticity
(Gewoifenheit). In his endeavor to 'uncover' the meaning of
Dasein, Heidegger argues forcefully stage by stage to make clear
that the being ofDasein is Care (Sor;ge), that the meaning of the
21

Martin Hei.degger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: HaJper and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 257-:!67 and
BW, pp. 119-122.

" Ibid., pp. 256-273.
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being of Care is Temporalily (Zeitlichkeit) via Resoluteness in the
face of death. This is intended to lead through and beyond the
phenomenological analysis of Dasein, thrOugh 'being-untodeath' (&in zum Tode, Selbstiindigkeit), to the Horizon of Beingas-such, which is the condition of the meaning of the being of
Dasein. In the development of Heidegger's argument and transition from the meaning of Dasein (Division One) to the meaning
of Being (Division Two), the phenomenon of truth is of increasing
significance and in the process the association or relation
between 'Being' (Sein) or 'Is-ness' and 'Truth' (Wahrheit, aletheia) becomes one of near interchangeabilily (cf. below).
Discussions preliminary and preparatory to '1144, 'Dasein,
Disclosedness, and Truth,' can be found directly and indirectly
throughout Being and Time. But two sections, '116 and '1139, stand
out as of particular importance and relevance as conceptual
background to '1144. Section 6 describes 'the task of a Destruktion / Deconstruction of the history of ontology' and bas obviously bad great influence upon recent philosophical and radical
theological developments. 23 In t,,!s brief discussion of the ~eed to
disassemble, so to speak, the history and, thus, the static and
'veiled' notions of Being in Western ontology in order to 'arrive' at
the original 'disclosure' or 'revelation' of Being in the preSocratics (e.g., Parmenides, 'making present'), Heidegger presents a brietbut most Significant study of the word 10gos.24 As
Heidegger states the point,
Legein is the clue for arriving at those structures of being which
belong to the entities we encounter in addressing olU'Se1.ves to

anything or speaking about it .,. As the ontological clue gets
progressively worked out-namely, in the hermeneutic of the logos-

it becomes increasingly possible to grasp the problem of Being in a

more radical fashion ... Legein itself-or rather noein, that simple
awareness of something present-ai-hand (Vorhandenheit) ... has
the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something.
Those entities (Das Seiende) which show (pfUiino as making present)
themselves in this and for it, and which are understood as entities in

23

24

The discussion of deconstruction/Destruktion in section six is, though brief,
Heidegger's attempt to 'dig' back through the layers of the history and
development ofWestem ontology in the hope of thereby laying hold again of
the 'original' revelation of Being (&in) as given to the pre-socratics (particularly Pannenides) before subsequent devefopments robbed the concept of its
dynamic qualities. Heidegger desires that by such a clearing process, or rather
the 'in-covering' of the original revelation of Being. that re-construction of the
Western tradition can then be pursued properly.

Heidegger. BT. pp 4-7, 48.
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the

Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (ousia).

Logos is understood then as letting something be seen, a showing
or making manifest the entily about which one is speaking. But
this making manifest or showing must be don~ in such a way that
it is thereby taken out of its hiddenness to let it be seen or known
as unhidden or dis-closed.
In '1139, Heidegger is attempting to make the extended (though
ultimately unsuccessful) transition from Dasein to &in. Therein
he explains that any entily is what it is independently of anyone's
experience of it as such or not. But he also states that there is no
Being except in the understanding of that being having understanding of something like Being ('those to whose being something like an understanding of Being belongs'), i.e., Dasein. Being
'is' lSein isO only so long as there is any being having the
understanding of something like Being (in contrast to 'entities')."
This is not intended to be reflective of some neo-Kantian
subjectivily, but is intended interestingly in the Cartesian sense.
This is not an alignment wtth Descartes' substance metaphysics
but wtth what Heidegger takes to be his true discovery of, or the
'un-covering' of, that which bad been lost or covered by
traditional concepts, 'subject-ivity' (cf. 'II 6). Being is that element
in ajudgment, expressed in a copula, which connects ajud!(ment
to an oDject (i.e., S is P, the Leaf is green). But wtthout beings
who understand (verstehen) or can make such 'connection' there
would be as such no Being, no Truth (the 'wbat is' ofsomethinJO.
So contra entities (Seiendes) Being CSein) only appears in the
understanding CVerstiindnis) of such entities. In the understanding of Dasein is the 'place' where Being occurs. Or, to put
that another way, Being exists as the understanding of Being (by
Dasein). In such expression of Being as the 'letting be as is,'
Heidegger explicitly established the connection, indeed the identily, iii Being and Truth." Upon such bases of argument,
Heidegger brings out the full import of his understanding of
'Truth as Disclosure' and the question or questionabilily of 'truth
as correspondence' in 1144.
At the opening of this section, Heidegger reflects positively on
the fact that Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics has
associated truth and Being, Being and thinking. Indeed, Parmenides 'identified Being wtth the perceptive understanding of
" Ibid.
.. Ibid., p. 228.
.:17 Ibid.
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Being.' From such a basis the 'traditional' concept of truth (i.e.,
'correspondence') bas emerged and taken varied forms as
reflected in three theses: first, the place of truth is assertion!
judgment; second, that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' ofju~ement with its object (adequntio intel1ectus et rei);
third, Aristotle's assignment of truth to judgment as 'agreement'
in the sense that in the experiences of the soul its 'representations' (noemata) are likenings to things.28 As this third form was
developed it became the basis of the Latin (as well as Jewish and
Arabic) formulation of Truth. Against the neo-Kantians, Heidegger points out that Kant too assumed the correspondence theory
of truth, i.e., truth as agreement of knowledge with its object. But
all of this leads him to the question of what is implicitly posited in
the relational totality (understan~owledge and thing) of
correspondence? In the relation of agreement' (adequntio or
correspondentia), in wbat is the 'agreement' to be found between
the understanding and the thing? Is it a relation between real
psychical process and Ideal content? There is a relation but is it
one of correspondence or something else? A coin and a statement
about it are obviously not identical Heidegger is thus led to ask
what the traditional correspondence reration 'reveals' ontologically. It is fauna that advancement can only be made by
making visible or present the necessity of cIari:f}'ing
... the kind of Being which belongs to knowledge itself .•. try to
bring to view a phenomenon which is characteristic of knowledgethe phenomenon of truth. When does truth become phenomenally
explicit in knowledge itself? It does so when such knowing demonstrates itself as true. By demonstrating itself il is assured of its
truth.""
In other words, what kind of 'Being' is knowing? In this

phenomenal context of 'demonstration,' '~ement' must become 'visible,' truth must become 'explicit. The human act of
knowing is that which brings truth into being in the sense that to
know truth (truly) is to know the thing in suen a way that it is 'let'
or 'allowed' to be on its own as it is. Heidegger's famous example
of the judgment that the picture banging on the wall is crooked
clarifies his point. The judgment is confirmed ('Behold so it is!').
But what is thus shown by this 'demonstration'? Agreement
between cOgnition and thing? Yes and no. It is not, as in some
forms of 'correspondence,' a relation of myself to a mental
representation. The true relation of knowing must be to the
23

29

lbid., pp. 257-258.
Ibid., p. 260.
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actual picture on the wall, the showing of the thing-in-itseIf. Thus
assertion or judgment is a way of 'Being towards the Thing itself
that is' in such a way that 'this Being is the very entity which one
bas in mind in one's assertion,' and that 'such Being (towards)
WICOVers the entity towards which it is.'3O What is to be positively
demonstrated then is only the 'Being-uncovered (Entdecktsein)
of the entity itself-that entity in the "how" of its uncoveredness.'31 In thus concluding that 'Being-true' means 'Beinguncovering,' disclosing the entity as it is, Heidegger has not at all
sought to overthrow the 'correspondence' conception of truth but
bas sought to expand the notion of correspondence truth by
showing that correspondence truth is rooted in and from a more
original (primordial) Truth (a1etheia as dis-c1osure, un-veiling,
un-covering) which is the 'condition' and basis of true correspondence. It is this way of Being (as logos) which Dasein can
either authentically 'uncover' or 'cover up.' Truth as dis-closure is
the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be
either true or false.32

V. 'TnIth as Disclosure' and ChrIstian Theology: The Case
of Thomas Forsyth TolTance
Thomas Torrance's response to and careful but formative use of
Martin Heidegger's understanding of Truth as dis-cIosure bas
,. Ibid., pp. 260-261.
31 Ibid.
" Ibid., p. 269. Though making a somewhat different contextual point, Hubert
L. Dreyfus strongly confinns this inteJpretation of Heidegger's onto~
understanding aod undergirding of Truth and a proper (critical) reaIism
when he states that 'Many intetpreters, however, understand Heidegger as
holding the instrumentalist view that scientific entities are social constructions
essentially related to hwnan pwposes, or else a fonn of operationalism
equation scientific entities with their intraworldly effects or measurements.
Such fonns of antirealism, as Arthur Fine puts it, 'accept the behaviorist idea
that the working practices of conceptual exchange eshaust the meaning of the
exchange, having it its si$ificance and providing it with its context.' But
Heidegger never concluded from the fact that our practices are necessary for
access to theoretical entities that these entities must be defined in terms of our
access practices ... in Being and Time Heidegger is what one might call a
minimIil henneneutic reaJist concerning nature aod the objects of natural
science, and that he remained such in his later work, even when he became
severe1y critical of the understanding of being underlying scientific research
aod technology.' Hubert L Dreyfus, 'Heidegger's Henneneutlc Realism,' in
The Interpretive Thm: Philosophy, Sclence, Culture, David R. Hiley, James F.
Bolunan, aod Richard Shusterman, eds. (Ithaa, N.Y.: ComelI University Press,
1991), pp. 26-27.
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apparently gone lar!!;ely unnoticed. Torrance understands Heidegger's concept otTruth (aletheia) to be not so much the
'condition' and basis/ground of correspondence (and coherence)
truth but more the very heart of correspondence truth. As such
he finds that Heidegger's understanding of Truth as 'dis-closure'
has many significant implications for theological knowledge of
the objective self-giving of God in his Word.
Thrrance's response to Heidegger's thought is admittedly
mixed. Negatively, Torrance believes that Heidegger, like Kant, is
to be faulted for finally denying that genuine knowledge in eve2:
proper field of inquiry is established in terms of the object s
actual, internal relations with real intelligihility (including
theo~ogy).33 In Heidegger, T~rrance sees finally a dualist leap into
nothing as a result of havmg lost the eternal-temporal interactivity (cf. his lengthy criticisms of the destructive modern
dualisms of and from Descartes, Newton and Kant). Torrance
finds that despite important advances Heidegger falls back. from
ontology to existentialism because he work.s with a nonconceptual relation to being as a result of the fact that logns is not
properly understood as inhering in being and therefore cannot be
~n~ grasped. Heidegger can only think. of letting being
~lose 1tse~thr~lUgh a non-conceptualleap into that nothing. In
this way he IS said finally to fall back. upon himself and his own
self-understanding.34
Yet Torrance also finds Heidegger's insights into realist thought
and truth to be of great importance. Going back. even to
Heidegger's dissertation on Duns Scotus, Torrance contends that
he rightly traced the difficulties of Western philosophy back. to the
false separation of thought from reality and the ascendancy of
abstract formalization over nature, all of which Heidegger
learned from Scotus. From Scotus, he is also said to have been
infl~enced to~ard a negative reaction to Aquinas' form of
realism. Also like Scotus, Heidegger has endeavored to establish a
more properly realist epistemology wherein room is made for a
Thomas Forsyth Torrance, The Ground and Grammar <if ~ (Charlottesville: The University Press of Vu-ginia, 1980), p. 42. Hereafter GG. Cf.
Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time antf Reswnctfon (Grand Rapids: WIn B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975), p. 151. Hereafter SrR. Cf. Robert P.
Scbarlemann, The Being of God, Theology and the Experience ofTruth (New
,. York: The Seabury Press, 1981), chapters two and three.
Thomas F. TOITance, Tram;formation and Convergence In tru. Frame of
Knowlet:\ge (Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishin!!: Company, 1984), p.
309. Hereafter TCFK. Cf. TOlTance, RST (Edinbmgb: The Scottish Academic
Press, 1981), p. 49.
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direct relation between mind and being. Heidegger's belief in the
openness of nature to empirical investigation of its intrinsic
relations and rational order is said by Torrance to have thus been
much influenced by Scotus' realism. It is as a result of this
iI;ldirect influence that Torrance interprets Heidegger as seeking
to clarif)r his critical realist concern regarding the Western
separation of logns from physis.35 In calling attention to the
problem of such a false and damaging severance, Heidegger is
said to have revealed appropriate concern for detachment of
thought from being. WIlen such a 'split' occurs, subjectivistic
human thinking then develops dictatorial, legislative habits of
thought which attempt to impose nomistic structures upon
being.36
According to Torrance, Heidegger desired that thought again
approach being appropriately in accord with being's own interior
principles of activity and powers of communication and signification whereby propositions are true only when manifesting being's
own intention. In this way, objective modes of thought are
correlated with the ultimate openness of being and its semantic
reference. It is here that Torrance is especially interested in
Heidegger's analysis and interpretation of aletheia.· Heidegger is
found to let being itself show through in its own freedom and
realily. In relating logos and physis, Torrance understands
Heidegger to correctly perceive that losos is the natural force of
being by which it manifests itself, by which it comes out into the
open and shows itself in its own light. Logos immanent in being
is not seen to be itself the locus of truth, but 'is the manifesting of
the reality of things or their unconcealment (aletheia).'37 Torrance finds it significant that Heidegger's understanding of Truth
has no need for intermediary representations, which happens
whenever logos is separated dualistically from being. This is
because the actual concern is with the showing of reality itself to
the human knower, which is why Heidegger gave so much effort
to the analysis of 'existence' (Dasein) in order to destroy the false
ontologies which arise by means of the verification of substitutesymbolisms. This was done in order that the entire focus of

J3

35
36

37

Ibid., p. 1.
Thomas F. TOITance, Theological &ience (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1969), p. 252. Hereafter 1'5. Cf. Torrance, GG, p. 81, as he follows Heidegger
and the description of how logos became s~ated from being and how-this
led to the attempt to throw a 'logical bridge,' natural theolOgy (a priori)
between knoMedge of this world and knowledge of God.
Torrance, RST, p. 47. cr. Torrance, Theol~ in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids:
Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 17-18. Hereafter TRst.
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attention would be directed upon being in the full and proper
sense (&in)."" Despite perceived problems, then, Heidegger is still
found by Torrance to have brought to prelinrinary corrective
clarity the need to allow reality to unveil itself in its own inner
intelligibility (aletheia). Torrance says that thinking must be
thrust up against the truth of being in such a way that it is
'sustained by an objective signification and does not fall back into
the dark whirlpool of man's self-understanding ... we grasp the
truth of intelligible being out of the depth of its own reality, but
we let it interpret itself to US.'39 Building upon Heidegger, then,
Torrance says that 'if (these structures or modes orthought)
serve the uncovering of being, let it show itself or come to view or
stand out in its reality, then they are true, but if they obscure
being or distort its showing forth by imposing ... an alien
structure of meaning ... they are false.''" Heidegger's understanding of a-/etheia or 'unconcealment' of being is highly
regarded by Torrance and developed in a way which reflects
Torrance's own emphasis on the disclosure and the realist
knowledge of objective being as correspondent as well as
coherent. Only in this way, he says, can objectivity and ontology
(the truth of beinglBeing) be recovered.
Basically, Torrance understands truth to denote a state of
affatrs which is necessarily and ontologically prior to the truth of
cognition or statement. The truth of being is basically synonymous with objective reality as it is dis-closed to be known. As with
Augustine, the truth is 'what is' or 'that which manifests what is
... and manifests it as it is.' Truth is said to enshrine at once 'the
real being of things and the revelation of things as they are in
reality. '41 As a result, thought and statement refer beyond
themselves and this is said to cIariJY scientific activity in theology.
In this, the knowledge of God as he is out of hirnseIf means that
human thought of God is thrown back upon God as its direct and
proper Object. Thought is brought increasingly into accord with
God as he is in his personal movement of disclosure, and thereby
as he is in himself. We are addressed by the compelling Word of
God's openness to be known in his 'unconcealedness' in Christ,
and then summoned to faithful and disciplined response in the
exercise of reason.42
38
39

40

41
42

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 48.
Ibid., p. 49. Cf. Torrance, God and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1971), pp. 177-178.
Ibid., p. 141.
Torrance, TS, pp. xii-xiii.
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Torrance is clear in his belief that behind all correspondent
truth of knowing there stands the Truth of God, Truth as
Personal Being. which bas taken the fonn of active life in human
historical existence inJesus Christ. He is the Truth of the Father.
InJesus Christ, God 'turns in Grace toward us and makes Himself
open to us . . . (bearing) directly upon us with theJ'resence and
impact of ultimate Truth.'43 Theology is concerne strictly with
the ultimate Objectivity of God who personally comes and
impresses his Truth in openness upon our thought, which then
has a corresponding conception of Truth and which is, in that
sense and in that measure, not provisional but ultimate. God's
Truth is his Word which is his own Person in selfcommunication. God's Truth is the.communication of himself
which is not apart from truths. But such truths must cohere in
the one Person of the incarnate Word of God in dialogical relation
with human knowing for faithful response. In this Godestablished knowing relation in Christ by the Spirit there is
adaptation of human thought and human thea-lOgical expression
in accordance with the creative, revealing and saving acts of God
among human beings. Therefore, thea-logical thought and
statement which would be faithful to its proper object must have
a logic of reference which does 'correspond to the logic of God's
self-communication to men-and correspond is here the
appropriate tenn.' In theo-logical sctence, Torrance is not merely
concerned with human reference to divine Being. but with
redemptive knowledge of the living God in Christ and by the
Spirit, with the responsive correspondence of human thought and
word to the divine Word, and human act with the divine Act in
accord with faith-ful sctentific process. Human theological statements arising responsively out of God's ultimate Truth will then
not be ultimate and final. Theological statements must refer
away from themselves and away from human subjectivity,
beyond, to the 'level' of ultimate Truth which has ontological
priority." As an ongoing process of conformation, adaptation or
correspondence to the Truth of God in its own objective, inner
coherence, sctentific clarification and progressive development
ensues in theological understanding and so in theological statements/disclosure models in the context of that faith knowing.
In theological sctence, in the pursuit of the theological task
which arises in and from the object knowing relation with God in
Christ, Thrrance advocates that correspondence and coherence
" Ibid., pp. 142-143.
.. Ibid., pp. 231..,232. Cf. p. 145.
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be finally integrated, for to know God in a realist way means that
one ('by the Spirit and through the Word') faithfulJy 'follows' or
'thinks after' the objective disclosure (a-letheia) of God's Word in
Christ in God's ' economic' coming, and finally into God's own
internal rationality and coherence as it is in the eternal relations
within the 'ontological' Trinity.
in this way may theology
serve the objective self-disclosure 0 God in Christ by the Spirit,
serve as an opening for rather than a barrier to God's self-giving
to and in the world, serve as a reponsive speaking which, by the
utter grace of God and at its own human 'level,' corresponds to
the real knowledge of the triune God in the person of the
Savior.
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a proper reckoning of correspondence truth and as essential to
his own critical realist theology. Specifically, 'truth as dis-closure,'
properly understood, not only brings healing to the epistemolOgical split resulting from disjunctive, dualist perspectives, but is
the basis of Torrance's emphasis on the Truth of the triune God
who has graciously given hlmself to be known as he is in the
Word made flesh, Jesus Christ, and in the power of the Holy
Spirit.
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VI. Conclusion

Thus contrary to much interpretation and use of Martin Heidegger's understanding of 'Truth as dis-closure,' Heidegger had no
intention of den;0;','g or doing away with or belittling 'truth as
correspondence. Rather his purpose was to clarifjr the foundation and to undergird such a knowing relation. Thomas Torrance
has not only recognized that this was Heidegger's goal but has
made Heidegger's understanding of a-letheia, 'Truth as disclosure,' the very center and basis of his own understanding and
expression of (critical) realist human knowing of objectively given
truth, particularly the Truth of the triune God who has graciously
given himself to be known as he is in the Word made flesh, Jesus
Christ, and in the power of the Holy Spirit. In this way, Torrance
has truly 'un-covered' the possibilities of Heidegger's 'correspondent' theo-logical usefulness for Christian theology, and,
most helpfully, the way of the Truth of God for human
redemption.
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from pre-Christian to modem Europe. He points out that anti-Semitism bas
found many pretexts over the course of history-racial, political, economic and
cu1tural-but it is on the religious pretexts, and the responsibility of Christians,
that this .rudy focuses.
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In this clearly-written study Alexander critically considers the Documentary

Hypothesis which arose :from SO\.lJ'Ce criticism, particularly in relation to certain
passages in Genesis. He hiJOili,e;hts the inconclusive nature of much of the
evidence presented in favoui- oftrhe Documentary Hypothesis and concludes
that 'it ~ms improbable that the book of Genesis was composed ~ a
process involving the combination of once independent, parallel sources. He
calls for new criteria to be established by which the source analysis can be

pursued.
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Abstract
Within the context of Thomas Torrance's larger concern to
critique the re-entrencbment of phllosophical (epistemological)
dualism in theology specifically and culture generally, there lies
his desire to re-establish a proper understanding of 'correspondence truth.' There have been multiple viewpoints on truth which
have been clustered under the heading 'correspondence.' Yet,
contrary to the sweep of interpretation of Martin Heidegger's
~, Torrance takes the Heidegganian view of truth as 'disclosure, the disclosure of Being (a-fetheia) to be the very heart of

The second edition of Calvin's Institutes, published in 1539, elicited a hostile
reaction fimn the Dutch Roman Catholk theologian, Albert Pighius. In his Ten
Books on Free Human Choice and Divine Grace, Pighius denounced Calvin's
chapters on the knowlet:(ge of humanity and free choice and the predestination
and providence of God. This translation of Calvin's reply to Pighius allows a
wider cin:u1ation of an important Reformation document.
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